And Now the Anglico

by LtCol. R. D. Heinl, Jr

Home        Back to ANGLICO History

Organized assault signal units, it seems bear much the same relation to the Marine Corps as some men's wives do to their husbands--something they can't live with, but something they still can't live without.

The basis for this observation lies in the fact that, only two years since its apparent death (on adoption of the ill-fated "J" tables of organization), we have witnessed the timely rebirth--under a different label, to be sure--of the often cussed and much discussed assault signal company, or ASCO.

Only this time we call it ANGLICO.

"Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company" is the full title, and, much like the de- parted ASCO, there is one per Marine division; in addition, we have a free-floating ANGLICO attached to FMFLant in a status and for missions we shall discuss in a few moments.

What and why is the ANGLICO?

Beginning with the "what".  We can explain that ANGLICO is a company within the division signal battalion (itself a newcomer), charged with the performance of air and naval gunfire liaison and control missions for one Marine division.  To those few and the group was in truth few, who understood very much about the late, maligned assault signal company, the ANGLICO will present few surprises, for it consists, with streamlining changes, of a 1950 model of the ASCO (less the latter's rather misfitted shore party communication teams).  That is to say, ANGLICO is a company level housekeeping and administrative "roof" which embodies a naval gunfire and an air support platoon; each in turn constitutes the air support or the naval gunfire package of a Marine division.

    Because ANGLICO, despite its different name, falls so closely into the logical history which characterized the assault signal companies of World War II, it is important that we look backward to see what the present unit's forebears were like.  This necessity for background becomes all the more pressing when we realize that the wartime ASCO (or even the JASCO)** constituted a veritable storm-centerof controversy and of no little complaint.

Taking them seriatim, the JASCO, the ASCO, and now the ANGLICO, existed and exist for a single broad functional purpose.  To provide a kind of wind-and-water bridge unit.  Composed largely of highly specialized communicators) enabling the amphibious division to tap the immense reservoir of external fleet support during the critical hours or days of new-born battle when air and naval gunfire are the elements that keep the landing force on the beaches.

Among quite a number of oddities which have always given assault signal units their rather queer coloration to the orthodox military eye, is the fact that the company--be it ASCO, JASCO, or ANGLICO--never fights (and only infrequently trains) as a unit.  Its only appearance in one place is between battles, for a Saturday inspection or pay-call.  In fact the only reason the company exists as such is to provide an administrative and housekeeping neighborhood in which the separate teams and parties that constitute' the outfit's raison d'être may live and conduct most economical, coordinate training.

The separate teams just mentioned are split 50-50 between the air support platoon and the naval gunfire platoon.  The teams, which belong to each arm, are, at war strength, apportioned during combat, to all the division's rifle battalions; to each rifle regiment; and one for division headquarters itself.  No additional means are at present provided either for reserve purposes or for special assignments to other than rifle units.  The missions of the respective teams, both air and naval gunfire, are 'to control, coordinate, and advise concerning the air support and naval gunfire support of the echelon to which the team may be assigned.

Hope this helps you to understand what ANGLICO is.

There remains unanswered, however, the "Why" which many of those ask who witnessed the seeming jettison of the predecessor ASCO during the "J" T/O hegira.  It will be remembered that, during this period, naval gunfire and air control elements were parceled out (in face of some misgivings among experienced officers) to become organic portions of the communication organization of the various battalions and divisions about which the "J" T/Os shaped themselves.

     Why, therefore, did we promptly resurrect the assault signal idea, and create the        ANGLICO?

The answer is twofold.

1.      The assault signal company, or ASCO, was not quite as dead as the "J" T/Os seemed to have killed it.  In the current war tables the ASCO, in fact, survived all along.  Even those who danced on its grave to the tune of "J" T/Os seem to have been unwilling to drive a stake through it heart by getting rid of it entirely as a wartime agency for service when chips were really down.

2.      The more impelling reason for renascence of the ANGLICO was the fact that it became apparent that such an organization as this was fully as necessary in peace as in war.

    The principal reasons why the ANGLICO (or some kind of division-level assault signal unit) remains (in spite of its rather unorthodox character) a vast and necessary improvement over any other expedient may be summarized as follows.
 

1.      The nature of training, both for air and gunfire teams, is susceptible of mass handling at a single level; moreover, the persons obviously best qualified to conduct this training are the division's two leading specialists in their respective fields, the air officer and the naval gunfire officer.  Both of these functionaries operate at division level.

2.       When organic to the communication elements of the lower (infantry battalion) units, the various air and gunfire teams are not only extremely hard to assemble for collective training, but also tend to lose their specialist abilities and identity.  About this time, they submerge into the run-of-the-mine communications work which hard-pressed battalion and regimental communications officers never see the end of.

3.      Unless concentrated in a single unit, individual air and naval gunfire teams tend to lose doctrinal uniformity, and often take on the differing coloration's of the preferences, not to say the professional eccentricities, of individual unit commanders under whom they constantly serve.

4.      Ideally speaking, a substantial portion of the annual air and naval gunfire team training cycle should be conducted away from the division, at gunfire and air support schools and bombardment ranges.  This detachment of teams can be more readily accomplished if they are grouped in a single unit at division level.

    Up to this point, we have confined ourselves to the ANGLICO, which constitutes part of the Marine division.  A while back, we spoke of one other air-naval gunfire liaison company, one, which operates directly under Fleet Marine Force Atlantic.

    The composition of this company is identical with those in two Marine divisions, its mission is somewhat different.

    The ANGLICO, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic, in some senses precipitated post- war decision as to how we should organize our air and naval gunfire teams.  Things happened in this wise.

    During the inevitable shaping of up and digestion of World War II's amphibious lessons, the Army disbanded its joint assault signal companies (the old "JASCOs", it will be recalled).  These had never for a number of reasons, been marked by great success, nor had they evolved as rapidly or as realistically as their Marine counterpart.

    More to the point, the very mission of the Army (as a cadre force for mobilization and large-scale land warfare) makes it desirable that this Service not maintains extensive specialized amphibious formations.

    For these reasons, it seemed logical that a non-divisional Marine ANGLICO be formed to provide air and naval gunfire liaison elements to support Army divisions during occasional ventures into amphibious training.  This additional ANGLICO operates as part of Fleet Marine Force Atlantic's force troops.

    In general, the effect of this decision was to bring about prompt organization of the Fleet Marine Force Atlantic ANGLICO.  This unit, in fact, became the prototype unit in the Fleet Marine Force, and it has already participated, lock, stock, and barrel, in both the MIKI and POR maneuvers.  The value of such participation has shown itself, of course, in the excellent air and naval gunfire training derived and in the less immediately recognized fact that existence of the Force ANGLICO greatly enhances the Marine Corps--Navy reserve of trained specialists in critical fields.

    For the benefit of the intelligent if tumultuous group who complain that nothing we did or were in the wholly amphibious days of 1945 any longer enjoys proper merit, it might be well to consider the charge that the ANGLICO reflects only the refined and evaluated practice of World War II, rather than any step forward.

In the main, it must be admitted, this observation is true. 

Thus, brand-new though the air-naval gunfire liaison company may be, we might even now be turning over in our minds the ways in which it can be improved for present missions, adapted or trained to perform new jobs, and in general shaped toward the next, rather than the past war.

In a word--what forward step can we expect or contemplate which will bring the ANGLICO fully abreast of the trends of tomorrow? 

As this writer reflects, there seem to be some nine possible changes or developments that would benefit the ANGLICO of today.  Adoption of any would represent a step forward.***

1.      Tactical air control and shore fire control parties have become unwieldy large.  If this trend continues, they may become unable to provide effective front-line support.  We must point aggressively toward general reductions--based, however, on fully acceptable cuts--thanks to all-purpose, lightweight communication equipment.

 

2.     Every possible measure must be taken to render the TACP and SFCP of next week a readily air-transportable or airborne unit.  Even the use of parachute TACPs or SFCPs should not be regarded as one normally contingent to any FMF unit.

 

3.      A shore fire control party (and perhaps a tactical air control party also) should be provided for each tank battalion.  Needless to say, this postulates the need for a specially equipped air or naval gunfire liaison tank, built to serve an armored OP.

 

4.     In each division ANGLICO.  There should be at least two additional shore fire control parties for "general reserve" duties--not only to provide much-needed trained battle replacements, but mote important to give us units to provide naval -gunfire support for the LVT-Als, for the reconnaissance company, or for offshore spotting work in control of regimental or divisional direct-support ships.

 

5.     We should look forward to and fully investigate the possibility of transforming the shore fire control party (SFCP) into a guided missile control party (GMCP).

 

6.     Along the same line, the forward air controller must prepare himself to become, if technology permits, an electronics guided missile specialist.

 

7.     As jet aircraft displace the conventional on-station support airplanes of yesterday, the forward air controller must increasingly prepare to assume duties now handled by the air coordinator.  This will involve the addition of new and specialized communications equipment as well as a considerable broadening of technique.

 

8.     Finally, the Fleet Marine Force ANGLICO must not only be regarded as an adjunct to peacetime maneuvers or to Army improvisations, but, more important, as a pool in being of trained assault signal teams for FMF mobilization and for conversion into corps or force air and naval gunfire control teams.

In terms of today's market for firepower, the air-naval gunfire liaison company is a better than average buy, a much more efficient package even than its war- sharpened predecessor, the ASCO.

Those, however, who know the pioneering spirit which has ever distinguished the Fleet Marine Force will be anxious that this unit--like every Marine unit--be oriented neither toward the past nor exclusively to the proven present, but to the future which--for the Marine Corps--looms so full of opportunity and so full of change.

FOOTNOTES

* For a discussion of the assault signal idea's wartime tribulations, see Minority Report on the (J) ASCO.  Marine Corps Gazette, July 1947.

** The difference between an ASCO (assault signal company) and a JASCO (joint assault signal company) was that the former represented an M-1945 Marine Corps evolution over the rather theoretical and not wholly satisfactory prototype JASCO, which, like so many military entities of a joint character, had proved to be less than workable when the chips were down.

*** One change proposed in a few quarters however would represent anything but a step forward.  It is the proposal by amphibious unsophisticated that artillery forward observers be once again (as in the pre-1943 days) employed as naval gunfire spotters, and the spotting team of the SFCP therefore eliminated.  While this looks attractive from the swivel chair, it just doesn't work, never did work, and, if adopted, would, in the words of one salty Navy observer, "Set gunfire support back two decades, if not back to Farragut."